Everything that is, is good because it is; the quantity, if one may use the word loosely, of being or existence which a thing possesses, is at the same time the stock of goodness.
Now in all these locutions the word conveys directly or indirectly the idea of desirability.
The merely useful is desired for the end towards which it is employed; the end is desired on its own account.
This sovereign idea, the Good, is identical with God.
It is not a synthesis of all other ideas but is unique, transcendent, and individual.
"Good" is one of those primary ideas which cannot be strictly defined.
In order to fix its philosophical significance we may begin by observing that the word is employed firstly as an adjective and secondly as a substantive.
That is to say, it is good because it is an efficient means to obtain a desired result.
The result, in turn, may be desired for itself, or it may be sought as a means to some ulterior end.
The objective idea is not indwelling in the essences of those things which fall within the scope of our corresponding universal concept, but the thing borrows or derives something from the idea.
While the being or existence proper to the world of things is imperfect, unstable, essentially transitory, and therefore not truly deserving of the name of being, whcih implies permanence, ideas on the contrary are incorruptible, unchangeable, and truly existence.
The theory leans, therefore, to dualism, and its influence may be traced through the early Gnostic and Manichaean heresies, and, in a minor degree, in the doctrines of the Priscillanists and Albigenses.